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Advancement of Learning
by Francis Bacon
PART 8
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H
XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil
knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy;
and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at
some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this
writing seemeth to me (si nunquam fallit imago), as far as a man can
judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound
which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments,
which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music
is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune the
instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands.
And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in
which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the
qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of
this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails
of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books
to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation,
which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of
natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not
employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of
Graecia did, in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome,
in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present
disposition of these times at this instant to peace; the consumption
of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which
have so much diverted men from other sciences; the perfection of
your Majesty's learning, which as a phoenix may call whole volleys
of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time, which
is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to
this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass
that of the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their
own strength and their own weakness both; and take, one from the
other, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem
of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a
quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to things of
worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular
estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or
others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and
patient request, Verbera, sed audi: let men reprehend them, so they
observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful (though it may be
it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of men to their
second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. Now let
us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so
blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and
port of all men's labours and peregrinations.
XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as
to the will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we
find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word,
though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only
that which is agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter,
and not to the author; which is no more than we would do towards a
suspected and discredited witness; but that faith which was
accounted to Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as
whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason.
(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to
believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's mind
suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such
one as it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth
from the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man
glorified; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are
known.
(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom
we call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God,
and not upon the light of nature: for it is written, Caeli enarrant
gloriam Dei; but it is not written, Caeli enarrant voluntatem Dei:
but of that it is said, Ad legem et testimonium: si non fecerint
secundum verbum istud, etc This holdeth not only in those points of
faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, of the
creation, of the redemption, but likewise those which concern the
law moral, truly interpreted: "Love your enemies: do good to them
that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father, that suffereth His
rain to fall upon the just and unjust." To this it ought to be
applauded, Nec vox hominem sonat: it is a voice beyond the light of
nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a
libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as
if they were opposite and malignant to nature: Et quod natura
remittit, invida jura negant. So said Dendamis the Indian unto
Alexander's messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras,
and some other of the wise men of Graecia, and that he held them for
excellent men: but that they had a fault, which was that they had
in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and
manners. So it must be confessed that a great part of the law moral
is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire:
how then is it that man is said to have, by the light and law of
nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and
wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of nature is used in
two several senses: the one, that which springeth from reason,
sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and
earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by
an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a
sparkle of the purity of his first estate: in which latter sense
only he is participant of some light and discerning touching the
perfection of the moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice
but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as
well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and
revelation from God.
(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the
latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for
nothing that the apostle calleth religion "our reasonable service of
God;" insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law
were full of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies
of idolatry and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd
characters. But most specially the Christian faith, as in all
things so in this, deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and
preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of
the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced the two
extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or
confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and the religion
of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument altogether: the
one having the very face of error, and the other of imposture;
whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with
difference.
(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the
former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God
to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine
and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries
themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of
argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument.
In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in
the expressing of His mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us;
and doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of
our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our understanding,
as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter
there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and
respective, although not original and absolute. For after the
articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from
examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make
derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of
them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; for
both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a
medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first
positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down
and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in
religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller
nature, namely, wherein there are not only posita but placita; for
in such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it
familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and
first laws of the game are positive, but how? merely ad placitum,
and not examinable by reason; but then how to direct our play
thereupon with best advantage to win the game is artificial and
rational. So in human laws there be many grounds and maxims which
are placita juris, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and
therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely
but relatively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long
field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason,
which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets of
God.
(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been,
to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true
limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine
dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing
usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed, to
search and mine into that which is not revealed; and by pretext of
enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is
positive. The one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus,
demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to
reveal them, Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex? The other
sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandalised at a
show of contradiction, Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis? Modicum et
non videbitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me, etc
(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and
blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of
would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the
vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but
the fury of controversies, wherewith the Church laboureth. For it
cannot but open men's eyes to see that many controversies do merely
pertain to that which is either not revealed or positive; and that
many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations:
which latter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that
great doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, ego, non
dominus; and again, secundum consilium meum, in opinions and
counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are now
over-ready to usurp the style, non ego, sed dominus; and not so
only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and
anathemas, to the terror of those which have not sufficiently
learned out of Solomon that "The causeless curse shall not come."
(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or
revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation; and with
the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence with that
which we have now last handled. The nature of the information
consisteth of three branches: the limits of the information, the
sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining the
information. Unto the limits of the information belong these
considerations: how far forth particular persons continue to be
inspired; how far forth the Church is inspired; and how far forth
reason may be used; the last point whereof I have noted as
deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong two
considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, and what
perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one
and the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light
according to the dispensation of times are material to the
sufficiency of belief.
(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as
deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of further
perfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a
subject tending to much like end as that I noted before; for as that
other were likely to abate the number of controversies, so this is
likely to abate the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw
the Israelite and the Egyptian fight, he did not say, "Why strive
you?" but drew his sword and slew the Egyptian; but when he saw the
two Israelites fight, he said, "You are brethren, why strive you?"
If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be slain by the
sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite,
though in the wrong, then, "Why strive you?" We see of the
fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, "He that is
not with us is against us;" but of points not fundamental, thus, "He
that is not against us is with us." So we see the coat of our
Saviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the
Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers
colours and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought to be
severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be pulled up
from the corn in the field. So as it is a thing of great use well
to define what, and of what latitude, those points are which do make
men mere aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.
(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true
and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains
of the water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of
two sorts: methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine
water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob's well, is drawn forth
much in the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and
fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from
thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received
in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former
sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my
judgment is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath
exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath
been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of
doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence.
(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a
compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first
they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to
brevity, we see in all summary methods, while men purpose to
abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgment by
contraction becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition,
and the exposition is deduced into large commentaries, or into
commonplaces and titles, which grow to be more vast than the
original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So we see
the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first
writings of the fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his
sum or collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern
doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults,
of which Tribonian compiled the digest. So as this course of sums
and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of
sciences more immense in quantity, and more base in substance.
(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact
methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to
support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than
substantial, like unto buildings which stand by architecture and
compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those that are built
more strong in their several parts, though less compacted. But it
is plain that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker do
you conclude; and as in nature, the more you remove yourself from
particulars, the greater peril of error you do incur; so much more
in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures by inferences
and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your positions.
(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to
be sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity the more
suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make
it round and uniform; but in divinity many things must be left
abrupt, and concluded with this: O altitudo sapientiae et scientiae
Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus, et non
investigabiles viae ejus. So again the apostle saith, Ex parte
scimus: and to have the form of a total, where there is but matter
for a part, cannot be without supplies by supposition and
presumption. And therefore I conclude that the true use of these
sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions
preparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them,
to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge is in all
sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.
(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large,
there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them
rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted.
Notwithstanding, thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures,
being given by inspiration and not by human reason, do differ from
all other books in the Author, which by consequence doth draw on
some difference to be used by the expositor. For the Inditer of
them did know four things which no man attains to know; which are--
the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of
nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession
of all ages. For as to the first it is said, "He that presseth into
the light shall be oppressed of the glory." And again, "No man
shall see My face and live." To the second, "When He prepared the
heavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the
deep." To the third, "Neither was it needful that any should bear
witness to Him of man, for He knew well what was in man." And to
the last, "From the beginning are known to the Lord all His works."
(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and
expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the
bounds of sobriety--the one anagogical, and the other philosophical.
But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: Videmus nunc
per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; wherein
nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as
the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication of this
enigma. But to press too far into it cannot but cause a dissolution
and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three
degrees of that we receive into it--aliment, medicine, and poison;
whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter
and overcome; medicine is that which is partly converted by nature,
and partly converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh
wholly upon nature, without that nature can in any part work upon
it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work
upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a
dissolution of the mind and understanding.
(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late
time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have
pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the
Scriptures; scandalising and traducing all other philosophy as
heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between God's
Word and His works; neither do they give honour to the Scriptures,
as they suppose, but much embase them. For to seek heaven and earth
in the Word of God, whereof it is said, "Heaven and earth shall
pass, but My word shall not pass," is to seek temporary things
amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek
the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to
seek the dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers,
whose place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in
the holiest place of all where the ark of the testimony was seated.
And again, the scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to
express matters of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in
passage, and for application to man's capacity and to matters moral
or divine. And it is a true rule, Auctoris aliud agentis parva
auctoritas. For it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a
similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature
or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, a unicorn,
a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that therefore he must
needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to be true.
To conclude therefore these two interpretations, the one by
reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which
have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and
cabalists, are to be confined with a a noli akryn sapere, sed time.
(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man,
touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth
make a just and sound difference between the manner of the
exposition of the Scriptures and all other books. For it is an
excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our
Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to
Him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question
demanded: the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which
knows man's thoughts by his words, but knowing man's thoughts
immediately, He never answered their words, but their thoughts.
Much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being
written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages,
with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates
of the Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be
interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of
the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon
the words were uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with
the words before or after, or in contemplation of the principal
scope of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or
collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite
springs and streams of doctrine to water the Church in every part.
And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, the main stream
or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical
or typical, are they whereof the Church hath most use; not that I
wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in
allusions: but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the
Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a
profane book.
(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can
report no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add. In
perusing books of divinity I find many books of controversies, and
many of commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as
it is made an art: a number of sermons and lectures, and many
prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and
concordances. But that form of writing in divinity which in my
judgment is of all others most rich and precious is positive
divinity, collected upon particular texts of Scriptures in brief
observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not chasing after
controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing abounding in
sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which will
remain, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded,
and I may speak it with an absit invidia verbo, and nowise in
derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine
and the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations
upon texts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons
within this your Majesty's Island of Brittany by the space of these
forty years and more (leaving out the largeness of exhortations and
applications thereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had
been the best work in divinity which had been written since the
Apostles' times.
(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of
belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration;
which is also judged and directed by the former--the one being as
the internal soul of religion, and the other as the external body
thereof. And, therefore, the heathen religion was not only a
worship of idols, but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for
it had no soul; that is, no certainty of belief or confession: as a
man may well think, considering the chief doctors of their church
were the poets; and the reason was because the heathen gods were no
jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had
reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they
might have external honour and rites.
(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of
divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith
containeth the doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of
God, and of the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three
persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes of God are either
common to the Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God
summary are two, that of the creation and that of the redemption;
and both these works, as in total they appertain to the unity of the
Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons: that of
the creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the
disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the continuance and
conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the
redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the whole
act and consummation, to the Son; and in the application, to the
Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh,
and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work
likewise we consider either effectually, in the elect; or privately,
in the reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church.
(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law,
which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the
edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law
positive; and according to the style, into negative and affirmative,
prohibitions and commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject
thereof, is divided according to the commandments; in the form
thereof it referreth to the three persons in Deity: sins of
infirmity against the Father, whose more special attribute is power;
sins of ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is wisdom; and
sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or
love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or
to the left; either to blind devotion or to profane and libertine
transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth
liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the
degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word,
or act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of
God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking,
and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which
quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners is the
elevation and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of
exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.
(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal
acts between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the
preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the
covenant, or as the visible word; and on the part of man, invocation
of the name of God; and under the law, sacrifices; which were as
visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration being in
spiritu et veritate, there remaineth only vituli labiorum; although
the use of holy vows of thankfulness and retribution may be
accounted also as sealed petitions.
(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of the
patrimony of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and the
offices and jurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the Church
directing the whole; all which have two considerations, the one in
themselves, the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the
civil estate.
(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of
instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The
declinations from religion, besides the privative, which is atheism
and the branches thereof, are three--heresies, idolatry, and
witchcraft: heresies, when we serve the true God with a false
worship; idolatry, when we worship false gods, supposing them to be
true; and witchcraft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be
wicked and false. For so your Majesty doth excellently well
observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see
though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all
of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of God; for
so he saith, Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, et quasi scelus
idololatriae nolle acquiescere.
(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report
no deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground
that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so diligent
have men been either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.
Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world,
as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and
description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate,
or not well converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in
any point receded from that which is commonly received, it hath been
with a purpose of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud; a mind of
amendment and proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I
could not be true and constant to the argument I handle if I were
not willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to
have others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by
this, that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not
seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's judgments by
confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am in good
hope that if the first reading move an objection, the second reading
will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I am
sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which
certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add
authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well
invented. For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as
on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim
and challenge to myself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due
tanquam adeps sacrificii, to be incensed to the honour, first of the
Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most
bounden.
Footnotes:
{1} Stoops in the rice and takes the speeding gold. Ovid. Metam,
x. 667.
